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FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE INTERNET:
WILL FREE SPEECH PRINCIPLES APPLIED
TO THE MEDIA APPLY HERE?
C. EDWIN BAKER*
Thank you, Professor Gregory.
I will refrain from correcting the appreciated inaccuracies in
your introduction. I like your reference to Luddites;' often I hope
to advance to that level of activism but fear I am too late in
cyberspace.
Yesterday evening, I went over to the apartment of the person
who earlier that day had asked me to be on this panel. She had
assured me that there was great porn on the Internet. I asked her
to show me, and she logged on and began searching but every time
we got someplace the message was, "this has been taken down due
to the Communications Decency Act."2 So, I did not get my quota
of porn for the evening. The Luddites did not appear outdated.
Apparently, they had already struck.
I want, though, to talk more generally about how the First
Amendment' should be understood in the context of cyberspace or
the Internet. In Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,4 a case dealing
with film from the early 1950s, 5 the Court made an oft-quoted
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. The notes to this talk have been prepared by the Journalwith input by Professor Baker.
1 See David L. Gregory, Introduction of the Panel on First Amendment & Regulatory
Concerns, 11 ST. JoiN's J. LEGAL. CommENT 709, 709 (1996).
2 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104, 110 Stat. 56, 56 (1996). With a
sense of irony, the Communications Decency Act was enacted as part of the larger Telecommunications Act of 1996, which, according to the Act's synopsis, was enacted "[t]o promote
competition and reduce regulation" in order to reduce prices and facilitate rapid availability of new telecommunications technology to consumers. Id. But see ACLU v. Reno, 1996
U.S. Dist. 1617 (E.D. Penn. June 11, 1996) (reasoning that term "indecent" as used in Communications Decency Act is vague; Due Process requires more than use of vague terms in
order to prosecute criminality).
3 U.S. CONST.amend I. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ....Id.
4 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
5 Id. at 503. The Court in Burstyn found that a New York statute that authorized a
Board of Regents to review films and license them unless they were "sacrilegious" was unconstitutional. Id. at 505-06; see also F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., Inc., 438 U.S. 726, 747
(1978) (citing Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 502-03) (noting that Supreme Court has long
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statement: "Nor does it follow that motion pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other particular
method of expression. Each method of expression tends to present
its own peculiar problems."6
What is usually not quoted is the language that immediately
follows. The Court stated, "but the basic principles of freedom of
speech and the press, like the First Amendment's command, do
not vary. Those principles, as they have frequently been enunciated by this Court, make freedom of expression the rule."7
Recently, it has been popular to think that long debated issues
are suddenly changed once turned into a question of speech on the
Internet. It seems to me, as a general matter, that this view is
wrong. For the most part, whatever the principles of free speech
are, and of course they are widely disputed, those principles will
apply to all media. For instance, I believe early last year there was
a serious concern about stalking on the Internet., I am not sure
exactly what amounts to stalking in terms of the criminal code, 9
but if it can be done by telephone or by the mail, then I assume
that it can also be done by the Internet. Similarly, if speech over
the phone or sent through the mail would not constitute stalking,
then that speech would not turn into stalking when you move to
the Internet. The same is true with libel, obscenity, and with
most other questions about what speech is protected. The same
general principles of the First Amendment apply to each media.
recognized that each medium of expression presents special problems in constitutional
analysis).
6 Id. at 503.
7 Id.
8 See Dan Morales, Internet Gives Savvy Con Artists One More Place to Stalk Victims,
SAN ANToNio ExPREss NEWS, May 29, 1996, at 2, 1996 WL 2834789 (discussing increased
access of con-men to public due to anonymity of Internet); see also On-line Stalking/Writer
Finds Words on Internet are Open Book, HOUSTON CHRON., Mar. 10 1996, at 24 (same);
Elizabeth Weise, Searched, Stalked on Internet, RocKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Mar. 10, 1996, at
74A (discussing Internet stalking case).
9 See N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.14(3) (McKinney 1994). The New York Penal Law defines
"Menacing in the second degree" as occurring when a person follows another person or
otherwise repeatedly engages in conduct that is intended to place the person menaced in
reasonable fear of physical injury, serious injury or death. Id.; see also William C. Donnino,
Stalking, printed in, N.Y. Penal Law § 120.14 (Mckinney 1996), Practice Commentary,
1996 Interim Update. Donnino's practice commentary describes the difference between
"menacing" and "harassing" for purposes of the Penal Law. Id. He notes that in contrast to
"menacing," "harassment" punishes the consequence of the actor's having placed a person
in reasonable fear of injury as a result of the harassment, regardless of the actor's intent.
Id.
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With more time, I would describe a number of areas where different media may raise distinct problems. I would not, however,
rely on the most obvious and the most frequently asserted distinction, that between broadcast and print media, as an example of
differing media leading to differing constitutional treatment.' 0
I recently argued that a careful analysis shows, at least at the
Supreme Court level, that the constitutional approach is generally
the same for print and broadcast media." Often, principles which
recognize government power to engage in structural regulation
and which are identified more with the broadcast media have, in
fact, controlled lesser known Supreme Court decisions in the print
area. 2 Moreover, Red Lion' 3 relied repeatedly on a structural regulation of print decision, Associated Press v. United States,14 in
sustaining broadcast regulation.
If I am right that all forms of media are treated similarly, the
real question is: What types of First Amendment principles apply? This is the question that should be hotly contested. I will
briefly discuss the question of relevant principles in one area, that
of indecency. What are the general principles of limiting the government's power to regulate indecency?' 5 The view that I believe
best describes the Supreme Court decisions is that, first, any regulation must be consistent with the principle set forth in Butler v.
Michigan.16 In Butler, the Court stated that the government cannot reduce adults to reading only what is fit for children. 17 No
matter how it regulates, the government must leave constitutionally protected expression substantially available to the adult audi10 See Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367, 396 (1969) (holding right to reply
requirement applied to broadcasting); cf. Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1969)
(same).
11 C. Edwin Baker, Turner Broadcasting Content-Based Regulation of Persons and
Presses, 1994 Sup. Cr. REv. 57 (1994).
12 See, e.g., F.C.C. v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775 (1978); Lewis
Publishing v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913); see also Committee for an Independent P-I, 704
F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1983).
13 395 U.S. at 396.
14 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
15 See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (live performance); Sable communications v. F.C.C., 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (telephone); Bolger v. Youngs Drugs Prods.
Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (mail and advertising); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., Inc. 438 U.S.
726, 740 (1978) (broadcasting); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Ginsberg v. New York, 290 U.S. 629 (1968) (print).
16 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
17 See id. at 526.
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ence.18 If the government pursues a valid regulatory goal in a particular medium by means that do not substantially reduce the
expression available to adults in such medium, the government
may proceed. It must not, however, pursue that goal by means
that violate the basic free speech rights of adult citizens.1 9
For example, the Court has recognized an interest of parents in
their ability to control the upbringing of their children, in particular, to control what type of expression their children receive.2 0 In a
society where many parents cannot be beside their children day
and night, but believe that indecency will be harmful or be undesirable for their children to see, the government may have a legitimate interest in providing these parents with a "safe zone" during
which they do not have to worry about their children's viewing. 2 '
For instance, the government might help parents who do not want
their child exposed to indecency by assuring them that in the afternoon, after school, television programming will not contain in22
decency. I believe, however, that F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation,
the George Carlin dirty words case, where the Court allowed regulation of indecency at two o'clock in the afternoon, does not justify
limits on indecency that go much beyond this after-school ban.2 s
In fact, much of the language in Pacifica suggests that the Court
would treat any channeling that violates the Butler principle as
presenting a much different issue and that such a restriction could
very well be unconstitutional.
Consistent with this emphasis on protecting adult speech
rights, I have argued that the channeling approved in Pacifica
may make sense. 24 Channeling that would, however, keep inde18 Id. at 382-83. The precise issue in Butler was whether a Michigan statute which
criminalized making a book that has a potentially deleterious effect on children was unconstitutional, which issue was decided affirmatively. Id. at 380, 383.
19 Cf Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 942 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that Communications Decency Act was overbroad due to its complete ban on constitutionally protected
speech between adults).
20 See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., Inc. 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978) (upholding F.C.C.'s
ban on afternoon broadcast containing expletives).
21 See, e.g., D. Adreano, Cyberspace: How Decent is the Decency Act?, 8 ST. THOMAS L.
Riv. 593, 594 (1996). The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104, 110 Stat. 56,
was enacted in an attempt to protect children from the dangers of certain inappropriate
adult oriented user groups. Id. An original version of the Act, introduced by Senator Exon,
was attacked for being overly broad as its language was considered not narrowly tailored to
meet the government's purpose. Id. at 593-94.
22 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
23 Id.
2A See C. Edwin Baker, The Evening Hours During Pacifica Standard Time, 3 VILL.
SPORTs & ENT. L.J. 15, 25 (1996).
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cency off the broadcast system from six o'clock in the morning till

ten or twelve o'clock at night should be unconstitutional.25 Such
regulation would reduce the availability of indecency to people
like me, who go to bed early in order to take the train from New
York to Philadelphia. It would mean that I could not watch indecency on broadcast at 8 or 9 in the evening, when I am still somewhat awake.
The regulation is constitutional if the government can pursue a
legitimate interest of aiding parents by regulating in a way that
does not substantially interfere with adults' rights, or the rights of
parents who want a broader range of materials made available to
their children. A modest channeling, similar to that of the
Pacifica case, does not amount to an abridgement. If, however, a
regulation interferes with adults' rights, then it amounts to an
abridgement of freedom of speech.
There are other approaches to indecency. One approach, accepted recently by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit en banc,2 6 utilizes a balancing analysis, and asserts
that society as a whole, not just parents as a subset, has an interest in keeping children away from indecency. With children
watching so many hours of television, this interest will require
more stringent regulation. The Court balanced the First Amendment interest of adults and those parents who want broader availability for their children, against society's interests in keeping indecency from children. In this balance, the Court allowed
abridgement of adults' speech rights, a result that, in my view,
was quite contrary to the leading Supreme Court precedents.
Whether the D.C. Circuit's en banc decision would be sufficient
to justify the Communications Decency Act 27 is not an issue that I
will address now. I suspect that the other panelists will show that
implementation of the Communications Decency Act would effec25 See id. at 55. In his article, Baker concluded that two reasons why the Supreme Court
may conclude that the F.C.C. can impose only restricted channeling of broadcasts are that
channeling during the afternoon, but not in the evening, is most consistent with the legitimate purposes that justify channeling and that only limited channeling is consistent with a
strong free speech principle. Id.
26 Action for Children's Television v. F.C.C., 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
27 Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104, §§ 501-602) (and other scattered sections within the TelecommunicationsAct of 1996). The Communications Decency
Act provides, inter alia, that whoever "initiates" the transmission of any communication
which is obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, or indecent with knowledge that the recipient of
such communication is under the age of 18 will be fined or imprisoned up to two years. Id.
§§ 502 (1)(a), (A)(ii), 502 (D)(2).
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tively take indecency off the Internet, a result that would be quite
troublesome from the perspective of the Butler principle. 28 My key
argument is that First Amendment principles do not change with
the medium even if their content continues to be contested. I will
continue to believe that the Supreme Court is committed to Butler
and the D.C. Circuit will continue to balance.
What T will do now is briefly discuss some other issues that are
particularly important for the Internet-two questions in particular. First, assuming that some speech is unprotected, whom can
you hold liable when that speech is made available? The person
who created it? The person who operates a computer bulletin
board on which it is posted? Second, what jurisdiction's law applies? The second question is relevant if, for instance, constitutional protection varies from place to place because community
standards are a relevant part of the obscenity definition, and often
community standards differ.2 9
Given more time, I would offer arguments about how to approach these two questions. Here, however, I suggest a rule of
thumb. The First Amendment requires the answers to be guided
by the notion that the chosen rule not substantially restrict protected expression. Any rule that, in effect, substantially restricts
the availability of expression protected by the First Amendment
3 ° considered
should be rejected. For instance, Smith v. California,
whether a book store owner could be prosecuted because there was
obscene material in his book store.3 1 The book store owner claimed
that he did not know, and there was no evidence that he knew, the
material was obscene.3 2
The Court held that whatever the permissible application of
strict liability is in other cases, because of the First Amendment,
28 Cf ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 835 (E.D. Penn. 1996) (holding that provisions of
Communications Decency Act were unconstitutional because they violated First Amendment protection of free speech); see also Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 942 (E.D.N.Y.
1996) (holding that Communications Decency Act was unconstitutionally overbroad).
29 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (holding that states may use community standards in determining what material is obscene); see also People v. Calbud, 49
N.Y.2d 389, 393 (1980) (holding that while United States Supreme Court has indicated
that issue of what constitutes obscenity may be determined with reference to local community standards, contemporary standards of communities throughout New York state are
proper measure of what is obscene within meaning of New York Penal Law).
30 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
31 Id. at 148 (discussing California statute that provided that it is "unlawful for any
person to have in his possession any obscene or indecent writing, [or] book ... in any place
of business where books are sold .... ").
32 Id. The statute contained no element of scienter in order to be prosecuted. Id.
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the book store owner must have knowledge of the obscenity before
he can be prosecuted.33 Without that, book store owners would
only make materials available that they had previously inspected
and that they were relatively confident were not obscene. This
would lead book store owners to reduce the availability of expression. The net result would be to substantially limit the communications environment. 34 Smith v. California illustrates the notion
of choosing a principle that does not result in a substantial restriction on the availability of protected expression, even when the law
deals directly with unprotected expression.
This principle is especially relevant in the Internet context. For
instance, it might require that bulletin board operators not be liable for defamation or copyrighted materials posted on their
5
server.

3

As a final example, consider a sexually explicit posting made by
a resident of California, where community standards would identify the posting as protected speech. Then someone downloads the
material in Tennessee, where community standards would view it
as obscene. Which state's law applies? A quick answer would be
that perhaps Tennessee law applies to the downloader, the person
who views it in Tennessee, and California law applies to the person who posted the material in a place where it is legal. 36 In contrast, allowing Tennessee to apply its standard to the California
resident who posted the content would improperly restrict protected speech.
Thank you.

33 Id. at 152.
34 Id. at 153-54.
35 Cf Cubby, v. CompuServe, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding, in
defamation case, that Compuserve was distributor, like bookstore or library, not publisher,

because it would not be feasible for CompuServe to examine all material it carries for defamatory content); see also R.F. Goldman, Put Another Log on the Fire, There's a Chill on
the Internet: The Effect of Applying Current Anti-Obscenity Laws to Online Communications, 29 GA. L. REv. 1075, 1083 (1995) (arguing that constructive knowledge standard for

Internet providers is too burdensome).
36 Cf United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996) (applying community standards of recipient's locale to prosecution of downloader).

